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Syria’s war is far from over but it is already the subject of a large number of books – many about the internal
dynamics of the conflict or the headline-grabbing jihadis who dominate perceptions of it. Christopher Phillips’
impressively-researched study of its international dimensions is an important contribution to understanding the bleak
story so far. Based on interviews with officials and a mass of secondary sources, it identifies and examines the key
external components of the worst crisis of the 21st century: the fading of American power, Russian assertiveness,
regional rivalries and the role of non-state actors from Hezbollah to ISIS.
Phillips’ principal argument is that the Syrian uprising
of 2011 – pitting ordinary people against an
unforgiving regime – was transformed into a civil war
because outside involvement helped escalate and
sustain it – and of course still does. Bashar al-Assad’s
brutal crackdown was followed by other actions that
made a significant difference: ‘omni-balancing’ Qatar’s
early backing for rebel groups despite its own limited
capacity; ill-considered US and Western calls for the
Syrian president’s departure; Turkish and Saudi
sponsorship of anti-Assad forces; and, from the start,
Russian and Iranian support for Damascus that raised
the stakes and created an asymmetry of strategic
commitment that persists to this day.
Inaction mattered too – whether in the lack of
adequate assistance for the rebels or Barack Obama’s
failure to response to the breaching of his famous ‘red
line’ when Assad used chemical weapons in Ghouta in
August 2013. Phillips correctly acknowledges the
lingering after-effect of the false prospectus of the
2003 Iraq war on the British parliamentary vote
against military action but I think underplays the wider
paralysing role of that intervention.
It was the misfortune of Syrians that their chapter of
the Arab uprisings opened in what the author
succinctly characterises as ‘an era of regional
uncertainty as the perception of US hegemony was
slowly coming undone’. Obama’s reluctance to get
involved may well have made sense after the lessons
of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, but he was unable to
manage his allies and, crucially, raised unrealistic
expectations amongst Syrians and the Gulf states.
Only ISIS, with its transnational agenda, moved him to act.
The landmarks of the crisis are familiar but they are illuminated by some fascinating details: Before 2011 knowledge
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about Syria was surprisingly limited, so there was insufficient understanding of the differences between its security-
obsessed, ‘coup-proofed’ regime and those in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain. In 2009, the US Department of
State Syria desk consisted of one official; of 135 Turkish diplomats working on the Arab world, only six spoke Arabic.
Francois Hollande’s diplomatic adviser, wedded to the ‘domino theory’ that meant Assad would follow Ben Ali,
Mubarak and Gaddafi, didn’t want to hear the nuanced reports from the well-informed French ambassador in
Damascus. Mistaken analysis drove what Phillips calls the ‘escalator of pressure’. Russia, with better intelligence,
understood that Assad was more secure than others predicted (or wanted to believe) and that the appetite for
western involvement was limited.
If underestimating Assad’s durability was a key failure, that was compounded by over-stating the capabilities and
cohesiveness of the opposition. Sponsorship by rivals who prioritised their own agendas, misleading extrapolations
from the Libyan example, inevitable tensions between the external opposition and fighters on the ground, and the
exclusion of the Kurds were all highly damaging. Policy towards the armed rebel groups was incoherent: despite
vast expenditure, no foreign state was able to gain leverage over them.
International and regional institutions performed little better, Phillips argues. The short-lived Arab League mission to
Syria was led by a Sudanese general linked to the genocide in Darfur. UN envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi
failed to overcome US and Arab resistance to Iran taking part in the 2012 Geneva conference, thus excluding a key
player at a sensitive moment. Staffan de Mistura shuttled between parties who refused to even meet each other in
Geneva, where the Syrian government delegation specialised in stonewalling and abuse. It has not been a case of
third time lucky for the UN. ‘Everybody had their agenda’, in Brahimi’s words, ‘and the interests of the Syrian people
came second, third or not at all’.
This judicious and measured book stands well back from the Twitter-driven ‘war of narratives’ that has distorted too
much media reporting on the Syrian conflict. In the heat and controversy of complex and terrible events, it is helpful
to pause and look coolly at the big picture. But it is sobering to contemplate the damning evidence of how outside
actors helped fan the flames of ‘an internationalised civil war’ without any end in sight.
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